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Abstract 
 
Several factors have been suggested to influence tax compliance behaviour. To date, some of the factors that 
have been considered include economic and noneconomic. Despite these studies, however, few studies have 
attempted to consider the influence of work family conflict and fuel subsidy removal on tax compliance 
behaviour. This paper proposes work family conflict and fuel subsidy removal to influence the compliance 
behaviour of the SMEs taxpayers. The proposed model will have several critical implications for understanding 
the factors that may influence the behaviour of the SMEs taxpayers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Tax compliance has been an issue for policy makers either in a developed or developing economy. Even though 
a growing literature exists in this area. But the emphasis on taxpayer compliance research was geared on why 
people and entities evade their taxes, rather than why remarkable number of people do willingly comply with 
their tax obligations (Slemrod, 1992). Therefore, the issue of tax compliance has been seen as a global 
phenomenon, for instance, the BBC news magazine (2013) statistically reported that, in the UK, low and even 
noncompliance is being recorded year in year out. According to the report, Amazon, Google units in the United 
Kingdom (UK), who separately recorded a turnover of 3.35 billion and 395 million UK pounds only paid 1.8 
million and 6 million UK pounds as tax. While Starbucks unit recorded a turnover of 400 million but engaged in 
transfer pricing with a sister company in New Zealand. In the same vein, another statistic issued by the New 
Sabah Times English (2013) revealed that, Malaysia Inland Revenue Board was able to solve only 1.9 million 
cases of tax evasion in 2012, which enabled the government to recouped RM2.95 million. 
 
In Nigeria the issue of tax compliance has become a national and public concern. Although, tax audits and 
investigation department exist in almost all the State Internal Revenue Service (SIRS) with appropriate 
mechanisms to address evasion, but the issue is on the increase among the SMEs (Taiwo, 2013). In recent times, 
Atawodi and Ojeka (2012) reported that, tax compliance issues remained a heinous task to achieve, as a result a 
good number of SMEs always carted away with a large chunk of unpaid taxes. As a result, Nigeria has been 
appearing on the bottom rungs of many global indexes of economic and social development. One of the latest 
indexes, “Paying Taxes (2014)", the index annually compares tax systems across the world. In 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013 and 2014, Nigeria was ranked 132th, 180th, 138th, 155th, 170th, and 179th out of 189 countries. The 
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ranking statistically revealed that, Nigeria is only better than 57, 9, 51, 34, 19, and 10 countries in relation to the 
years of observation. The assessment, was based on three major indicators, namely; total tax rate, number of 
payments and compliance time, which further revealed that, Nigeria’s tax administration was ranked better than 
only 10 countries out of the 189 countries surveyed at the end of 2014. The report further disclosed that, the 
latest ranking explained the Nigeria’s decline in the index was due to the fact that, the time it takes for SMEs to 
comply with the requirement of the tax payment is longer than what is reported in most countries. 
 
Furthermore, a growing number of reports have shown that, issues of tax evasion are on the increase. For 
instance, Tanko (2014), reported that, Kaduna state government alone lost over N18 billion ($112.5 million) in 
2013 in unpaid taxes. This act culminated in the closure of twenty-five (25) private schools, hospitals, eateries, 
hotels and even some micro finance banks over tax evasion. In the same vein, Shekari (2014) further reiterated 
that, out of the 6 million taxable residents in the state, only five hundred thousand (500,000) pay their taxes. 
Theoretically, many studies were available on the relationship between the factors that influenced tax and or a 
combination of other factors on tax compliance behaviour (e.g. Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Becker, 1968; 
Chris, Coleen, & David, 2000; Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992; Manaf, Hasseldine, & Hodges, 2005; Mustafa, 
1997; Nur - tegin, 2008; Palil, Hamid, & Hanafiah, 2013; Saad, 2014; Torgler, 2005). Similarly, psychological 
factors have also proven to be important factors that influenced tax compliance behaviour, as such; incentives i.e. 
positive inducement, tax knowledge, and public governance quality (PGQ), have been widely discussed 
(Alabede, Ariffin, & Kamil, 2011; Chris et al. 2000; Manaf, 2004; Mustafa, 1997; Richardson, 2006; Saad 
2014).  
 
Even though, not much has been written on the phenomenon of tax compliance in the Nigerian setting, except 
for few studies, such as Alabede, Ariffin and Kamil (2012) who studied the factors influencing tax compliance 
behaviour in Nigeria. The study did not cover the Nigerian SMEs. However, the researcher's scope was limited 
to taxpayers of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) only. Similarly, Atawodi and Ojeka (2012) also studied the 
factors influencing tax compliance behaviour of SMEs taxpayers in the North - Central Nigeria. Moreover, the 
researcher's scope was only limited to SMEs taxpayers of a single local government (i.e. Zaria). As a result, none 
to the researcher's knowledge ever investigated the relationship between work family conflict (WFC), fuel 
subsidy removal (FSR) and tax compliance behaviour of SMEs owners/managers. However, work family 
conflict was found to be associated with other factors, such as job performance, organizational commitment, 
individual commitment, and stress (e.g Aryee, 1992; Frone, Yardley, & Markel, 1997; Kalliath & Kalliath, 2013; 
Kossek & Ozeki, 1999; Wickens, 1996). And fuel subsidy removal was found to impact on the agricultural 
sector, the cost of production, the cost of transportation, and growth (e.g. Kehinde, Kyade, Felix, Musibau, & 
Ishola, 2012; Odemero, 2013). Despite these aforementioned empirical studies, however, it is surprising that, 
presently, there is barely an empirical study that conceptualizes and proposes the work family conflict, fuel 
subsidy removal and tax compliance behaviour relationship in the literature. Thus, the inclusion of these 
variables is in line with the need for studying more psychological and other noneconomic factors as suggested in 
the literature (Stefura, 2011, 2012). To fill in this gap, this paper proposes work family conflict and fuel subsidy 
removal as an antecedent of tax compliance behaviour. Specifically, this paper will attempt to argue why work 
family conflict and fuel subsidy removal are theoretically important in influencing the behaviours of the 
taxpayers, thereby contributing to the extant literature of tax compliance. 
 
In addition, the remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. Next, a discussion on the important concepts 
of tax compliance is highlighted. In particular, the concepts of work family conflict, and fuel subsidy removal 
are explored. Then, previous works that relate the concepts are presented toward the development of a model that 
explains the relationships. To link these relationships, work family spill over theory and social exchange theory 
are used as a basis. Hence, elaborations of these theories are also offered below. 
 
2.0  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Tax compliance 
 
One of the critical tools for revenue collection of any responsible government is the attainment of an optimal 
level of tax compliance in relation to taxpayers. Therefore, James and Alley (2004) pointed that, tax compliance 
is one of the fundamental issues confronting many relevant authorities across the world. Hence, a herculean task 
to persuade taxpayers’ to comply with the requirements even though tax laws are always dynamic. 
 
However, the definition of tax compliance in its simpler form is usually narrow in terms of the magnitude to 
which taxpayers’ comply with the tax law and regulations. Unlike other concepts, the meaning of tax compliance 
can be viewed as a phenomenon that changes over time. According to James and Alley (2004), tax compliance 
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can be categorised into two approaches, i.e. the traditional narrow law enforcement, to the wider economic 
perspectives and through the more comprehensive approach relating to taxpayer decisions to conform to the 
wider objectives of the society as reflected in the tax policy. As such, the meaning of tax compliance has been 
defined in so many ways, For instance, Song and Yarbrough (1978) in a simple term, defined tax compliance as 
the taxpayers ability and willingness to comply with the relevant tax laws and regulations, which are determined 
by ethics, legal environment and other factors at a given time and place. 
 
Furthermore, over the years several tax authorities and multinational organizations are not left out in suggesting 
a similar and appropriate definition for tax compliance. Hence, the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) (2009); and 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) (2009) separately defined tax compliance as taxpayers ability and willingness to 
obey the tax laws, declare their actual income annually and pay the right amount of taxes on due date. Moreover, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2001) outlined two categorization for 
the definition of tax compliance i.e. technical compliance and administrative compliance. According to their 
findings, technical compliance has to do with the technical requirement of tax laws in the computation of tax 
liability, whereas administrative compliance is always in line with the combination of reporting compliance, 
procedural compliance as well as regulatory compliance. In short, it is generally concerned with complying with 
the rules relating to lodging and payment of tax. Therefore, compliance is enforced on taxpayers that were 
unable to pay taxes through the use of other mechanisms such as; threat and application of audit and penalties 
(OECD, 2001). Notwithstanding, Roth, Scholz, and Witte (1989) defined tax compliance, as the ability to 
comply with the reporting requirements, which invariably means that, the entity files all required tax returns at 
the proper time, and the returns accurately report tax liability in accordance with the internal revenue code, 
regulations and court decisions applicable at the time the returns are filed. An alternative to this definition has 
been offered by James and Alley (2002) which define tax compliance as the ability of taxable entities to respond 
in relation to the spirit as well as the letter of relevant tax laws without the administration or application of 
enforcement. They consider tax compliance in terms of the tax gap, i.e. the difference between the true entity's 
income tax liability and that which is finally collected by either voluntary payment or by enforcement.  
 
Consequently, there are few studies that viewed tax compliance from another dimension. For instance, McBarnet 
(2003) perceived that, tax compliance can be structured into three dimensions, such as; committed compliance: 
which has to do with the taxpayers’ willingness and ability to pay his/her taxes without grudges; capitulative 
compliance: willingly giving in and paying taxes and; creative compliance: engagement to reduce taxes by 
taking advantage of possibilities to redefine income and deduct expenditures within the bracket of tax laws. 
Hence, tax compliance is defined as the willingness of the taxpayers to abide by the tax laws, declare the correct 
income, claim the correct deductions, relief and rebates and pay all taxes on time (Palil & Mustapha, 2011). 
Recently, Geibart (2014) conceived tax compliance as a means of navigating a maze of rules, regulations, 
exceptions and exemptions, which can leave a tax agent confused, disorientated and often lost when they reach a 
frustrating dead end. 
 
It is noticeable from the definitions proffered by different authors on the use of some keywords which 
accompanied their individual or collective assumption, such as willingness, ability, obey, act of filing tax returns, 
declares the correct amount, reporting all income, right amount of tax, timeliness as it is used in their respective 
definition. None to the researchers' knowledge borrowed the word "appropriate quotas", therefore without 
identifying the appropriate quotas or jurisdiction in paying taxes, may result to noncompliance even though the 
taxpayer has complied. Based on the foregoing, and considering the context in which the study is going to be 
conducted, thus in the context of this study; tax compliance is defined as the taxpayers’ ability and willingness to 
obey the tax laws, declare their actual income and pay the right amount of taxes on due date to the appropriate 
quotas or jurisdiction.  
 
2.2  Work Family Conflict (WFC) and Tax Compliance 
 
Although construct of work family conflict has gained a lot of momentum in the literature, however, Greenhaus 
and Beutell (1985) viewed work family conflict as a form or type of inter role conflict in which one's 
requirement of role conflict make it difficult to have a valuable time with the family, or when commitment in the 
family makes it difficult to be fully engaged at work or to meet individual organizational responsibilities and 
obligations. As such, Kossek and Ozeki (1998) found that, the presence of high work family conflict can lead to 
low individual, and organizational commitment (for instance the commitment of the organization in relation to 
tax payment) in the long run. Similarly, Wickens (1996) also opined that, stress resulting in attention tunnelling, 
and work family conflict may create additional demands (e.g. financial obligations to meet family pressure, 
which may affect tax payment and compliance behaviour of the taxpayer). Hence, in a situation where the work 
family conflict is perceived to be high, attention to organizational obligations (for instance, tax compliance) and 
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perceived ability to devote discretionary energy to tax payment and other organizational obligation may not be a 
conscious priority. Aligning to work family spillover theory which states that, either system (i.e. family or work) 
may have or possessed a spillover effect or influence on the other (Staines, 1980). Similarly, the theory further 
proposes that, satisfaction or dissatisfaction in one area of life extends to other domains (conflict in the family 
may affect individual business obligations (such as tax payment and vice versa) (George & Brief, 1990). For 
instance, Nzotta (2007); and Odinkonigbo (2009) in a related but separate study, affirmed that, poverty and 
extended family burden (for instance, financial obligations) may be seen as one of the causes of tax 
noncompliance in Nigeria. Even though, studies that measure the direct effect of work family conflict on 
compliance behaviour of taxpayers' are rare. On the basis of the above submission and drawing from the work 
family spillover theory, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between work family conflict and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
2.3  Fuel Subsidy Removal (FSR) and Tax Compliance 
 
Numerous definitions of fuel subsidy removal can be found in the literature. However, these definitions have 
taken different perspective. Therefore, Ikpeze, Soludo, and Elekwa (2004), Nwafor, Ogujiuba and Asogwa 
(2006); and Iyobhebhe (2011) in a separate but related study reported that, fuel subsidy removal is seen as a form 
of price manipulation where the government fixes the pump price of fuel for sale to consumers and pays the 
retailer the difference between the actual market price and the regulated or official price per litre. Even though a 
quite number of studies provide empirical evidence on how fuel subsidy removal negatively influenced other 
factors, such as the cost of business operation, effects on SMEs (Hoai & Thang, 2013; Hope & Singh, 1995; 
Kehinde et al., 2012; Odemero, 2013). While Taiwo (2013) further reiterated that, fuel subsidy removal will 
compound extreme pressures on disposable income as well as intensifying further loss of tax revenue and higher 
cost of enforcing compliance. As such, SMEs taxpayers', who experience more hardship in terms of trying to run 
their respective businesses, may perceive the government as being responsible for causing the misery. As a 
consequence, it may affect their compliance behaviour negatively. In connection to social exchange theory 
which suggests that, individuals in any commitment always direct their reciprocation or symbiotic efforts 
directly to the sources of any rewards they received (Blau, 1964). For instance, if taxpayers' perceived that, the 
government is being fair towards investing the revenue derived from the fuel subsidy removal, their behaviour 
towards tax compliance may tend to change positively. On the contrary, if the taxpayers' perceived, the 
government is not being fair towards reinvesting the proceeds or revenue derived from the fuel subsidy removal, 
the level of compliance may be affected negatively. Hence, Taiwo (2012) claimed that, the effect of fuel subsidy 
removal will cause companies and individuals to consume less fuel, as well pay less tax. Thus, this line of 
argument is consistent with the tenets of social exchange theory, and its relationship with fuel subsidy removal 
and tax compliance behaviour. Hence, the following hypothesis is hypothesised: 
 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between fuel subsidy removal and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
3.0  PROPOSED RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
 
Building on the above discussion and literature review, a proposed research framework for this study illustrating 
the influence of work family conflict and fuel subsidy removal on tax compliance behaviour is depicted in Figure 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Proposed Research Framework 
 
 
The proposed research framework shows the influence of work family conflict, fuel subsidy removal on tax 
compliance behaviour. Based on Figure 1, the effect of work family conflict may go a long way in influencing 
the taxpayers' perception in relation to their respective compliance behaviour. Therefore, Nzotta (2007); and 
Tax compliance 
Behavior 
Fuel subsidy removal 
Work family conflict 
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Odinkonigbo (2009) in a related but separate study, affirmed that, poverty and extended family burden (for 
instance, financial obligations) may be seen as one of the causes of tax noncompliance in Nigeria. In the same 
vein, Wickens (1996) also reiterated that, stress which emanates in attention tunnelling, and other work family 
conflict issues may create additional demands (e.g. financial obligations to meet family pressure, which may 
affect tax payment and compliance behaviour of the taxpayer). 
 
The above argument is supported by the Work family spillover theory, which states that; either system (i.e. 
family or work) may have or possessed a spillover effect or influence on the other (Staines, 1980). Similarly, the 
theory further proposes that, satisfaction or dissatisfaction in one area of life extends to other domains (conflict 
in the family may affect individual business obligations (tax payment and vice versa) (George & Brief, 1990). 
Therefore, excess work may have an effect on the family and vice versa (Kelly & Voydanoff, 1985). 
 
Furthermore, fuel subsidy removal may also influence the perception of the Nigerian taxpayers’ in shaping their 
compliance behaviour. Thus, Taiwo (2012) reported that, fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria, will transmit in higher 
cost (for instance, the cost of production, raw materials, overheads, and transportation cost, which may affect 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour) i.e. companies and individuals. To further buttress the above statement, 
transportation system in Nigeria is in a sorry state, where the motorist are free to fix whatever price they so wish 
to the public. As such, since the subsidy removal hardship is mostly experienced by the masses, as a result the 
compounding effect may finally be shifted to the SMEs, owners, since they only rely on the commercial 
transportation system in transporting their raw materials as well as dispatching their finished products to the 
wholesalers or retailers as the case may be. Similarly, Odemero (2013) affirmed that, fuel subsidy removal was 
assumed to translate to a general increase in the cost of business operation (for instance, overhead cost, 
production cost and cost of compliance, which may affect tax compliance behaviour). To further expatiate the 
above findings, cost of business operation is one of the most important key factors that always consume business 
resources, especially when the business is in its early stage of development. Therefore, taxpayers’ vis a vis SMEs 
owners, will always be subjected to so many pressures in order to balance the expenditures on raw materials, 
rentage, staff salaries, and so on, due to the fact that, the price of every aspect of their business was affected by 
the resultant effect of fuel subsidy withdrawal. 
 
This assertion is supported by the social exchange theory. The theory states that, relationship is absolutely built 
on the basis of cost and benefit, and for it to continue or survive, it must be beneficial to all parties (Blau, 1964). 
As such, the revenue derived from the subsidy removal supposed to have been used to finance the infrastructural 
facilities which by extension may encourage the taxpayers’ in keeping the covenant of reciprocity. Whereas, in a 
situation where such contract is void, it may affect the taxpayer otherwise, which in turn may influence his/her 
compliance behaviour. On the basis of the above analogy and logic, work family conflict, fuel subsidy removal 
and tax compliance behaviour are expected to show some reasonable level of correlation. 
 
4.0  CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper has presented a model on the influence of work family conflict, and fuel subsidy removal on tax 
compliance behaviour as depicted in figure 1. The proposed model has several critical implications for 
understanding the factors that may influence the behaviour of the SMEs taxpayers. Firstly, if the proposed 
framework is validated, the findings will provide important insight to the states internal revenue services, and 
other regulatory authorities into the significant role of work family conflict, and fuel subsidy removal in 
explaining the puzzle of tax compliance. Secondly, the paper also suggests if the proposed framework is 
validated, the findings will have practical implications towards achieving the Nigeria's vision 20:2020. For 
example, the relevant revenue service can reduce the likelihood of tax compliance issues among taxpayers by 
considering the effects of work family conflict and fuel subsidy removal amidst other factors. 
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